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  This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large 
commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business 
policy decisions made by these firms.  We find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to 
contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to 
encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives 
in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking.  These relationships are strongest during 
the second half of our sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks’ 
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The historic collapse of U.S. home values, and the subsequent losses incurred by 
investors in mortgage-backed securities, wreaked havoc on the capital positions of both large and 
small financial institutions around the world.  The market value of the global banking industry 
declined by slightly more than half during 2008, while the market capitalization of the ten largest 
U.S. commercial banks fell by about 65%.
1  To prevent the most heavily impacted banks from 
collapsing, the U.S. Treasury injected over $300 billion in preferred and common equity capital 
into commercial banking companies through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  The 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve provided an even larger amount of aid—in the form of equity 
injections, loans, and loss guarantees—to rescue the hugely insolvent financial firms American 
International Group (AIG), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Bear Stearns. 
Politicians and policymakers quickly sought to limit the compensation of executives at 
the banking companies that received taxpayer support.  In March 2009, a second round of TARP 
capital injections was made contingent on executive pay limits.  Also in March, President Obama 
instructed Treasury Department to "pursue every legal avenue" to block bonuses due to 
executives and other financial professionals at AIG:
2  
"This is a corporation that finds itself in financial distress due to recklessness and 
greed…  Under these circumstances, it's hard to understand how derivative traders 
at AIG warranted any bonuses, much less $165 million in extra pay. How do they 
justify this outrage to the taxpayers who are keeping the company afloat?” 
  
A few days later the House of Representatives joined the fray, passing a bill that placed a 
confiscatory 90% tax on compensation above $250,000 at any financial institution that received 
                                                 
1   Estimates from the Boston Consulting Group (2009) and Reuters (2009), respectively. 
2 “Obama Asks Geithner to Find Way to Rescind AIG Payouts,” Wall Street Journal March 16, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123721970101743003.html?mod=djemalertNEWS.   3
more than $5 billion from TARP.  Although this measure did not become law, both 
Congressional members and the Administration continue to advocate for new rules to govern 
executive pay, e.g., by increasing shareholder power and board responsibility over the terms of 
compensation contracts, by strengthening bank supervisors’ ability to monitor and restrict 
executive pay, or by imposing outright restrictions on pay practices thought to encourage short-
run risk taking at the expense of long-run firm value.
3  In October 2009, the Treasury’s “special 
master for compensation” Kenneth Feinberg used authority granted by Congress to rewrite the 
compensation contracts of the 25 highest paid employees at each of the seven largest TARP 
recipients, slashing executive salaries and shifting compensation to longer term stock grants.  
Simultaneously, the Federal Reserve proposed reviewing the pay practices at 28 large, complex 
banking organizations “to determine their consistency with the principles for risk-appropriate 
incentive compensation.”
4              
Government interference in private firm executive compensation has been rare in the 
U.S.
5  But the massive taxpayer assistance to large financial firms in 2008 and 2009 has 
generated substantial popular support for government intervention to control and/or punish 
“recklessness and greed.”  Good public policy, however, should be based on less subjective 
phenomena.  If one argues for a government role in setting the terms of bank executive pay, then 
                                                 
3 See “Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance,” Wall Street Journal On-line, March 13, 2009; 
“U.S. Eyes Bank Pay Overhaul,” Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2009, page 1; and “Investors Take Note: New Bill to 
Target Boards, Say on Pay,” Wall Street Journal On-line, May 24, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124061794487355095.html.       
4 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, October 22, 2009. 
5 One example is the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 which capped the corporate tax deduction for a 
firm’s five highest paid managers to $1 million; beyond this amount, only "qualified performance-based pay" merits 
a deduction.  The law was intended to better align executive compensation with corporate performance.  Gritsch and 
Snyder (2005) find that stock option compensation has increased as a result of this change.      4
one must also be willing to argue that the incentives embedded in existing compensation 
arrangements either directly or indirectly lead to such risk-management mistakes, and moreover 
that bank boards take insufficient action to correct these incentive problems once they arise.  
Accordingly, in this study we devise and implement empirical tests of two relevant questions.  
First, were the incentives in executive compensation contracts at U.S. commercial banks during 
the 1990s and 2000s systematically associated with excessive risk-taking and financial 
mismanagement?  Second, did bank boards adjust executive pay incentives to counter 
mismanagement and excessive risk-taking?  A role for government intervention requires an 
affirmative answer to the first question, a negative answer to the second question, and a belief 
that intervention can have a net positive impact on social welfare (i.e., not make things worse).   
The financial performance of any company is driven by three key elements:  the business 
model in place, how well executives execute that business model, and external conditions 
beyond the control of executives.  These three elements converged in late-2007 for many of the 
largest U.S. financial companies, with dire results.  For much of the preceding two decades, large 
commercial banks had been transitioning their retail businesses away from the traditional 
“originate-and-hold” lending model that relies on interest income generated from repeat 
borrower-lender relationships, and toward an “originate-and-securitize” lending model that relies 
heavily on the fee income generated by non-repeat, arms-length financial transactions.  This new 
business model channeled trillions of investor dollars to mortgage borrowers, in exchange for 
which the investors (primarily commercial and investment banks, insurance companies, and   5
pension funds) held mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and/or derivatives of MBS.
6  T h i s  
approach generated record earnings for banks from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s; 
however, these were years of relatively benign economic conditions, and growing this business 
model absent the disciplining effects of economic stress encouraged excesses.
7  The collapse of 
the housing bubble exposed these excesses, most notable the investment grade-rated 
securitizations of subprime mortgages that performed so abysmally once home prices stopped 
rising.  In retrospect, it is now clear that managers at commercial and investment banks also 
committed a number of fundamental risk-management mistakes.  Portfolios were over-weighted 
in MBS, as institutional investors underestimated the covariances of housing prices across 
regions.
8  Financial leverage was often excessive, whether funding MBS investments on the 
balance sheet or in off-balance sheet investment vehicles.  And these levered portfolios of long-
term assets were often financed with short-term debt, suggesting that managers forgot or simply 
ignored the key lessons of the 1980s savings and loan crisis.     
Throughout this transformation of the large bank business model, the total compensation 
paid to CEOs at the largest U.S. commercial banks differed little from the total compensation 
paid to CEOs at large U.S. industrial corporations (see Figure 1).  However, the incentives 
                                                 
6 These derivatives include interest-only and principal-only instruments backed by pools of mortgages, and more 
complex collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by pools of MBSs.  Loan securitization has also increased in 
credit card, auto loan, student loan, and small business credit markets; however, financial losses on the asset-backed 
securities created in these transactions have not occurred as quickly, nor have they been as large, as for MBS. 
7 Between 1991 and 2007 there was only a single, relatively shallow recession.  And ironically, the consumer 
spending generally credited for the mildness of the 2001 recession was made possible by mortgage securitization, 
which permitted homeowners to more readily access the equity that would previously been locked up in their homes.    
8 This view was not limited to investors in home real estate securities.  Alan Greenspan famously stated during 
congressional testimony that upward pressure on home prices was largely a regional phenomenon and that 
nationwide declines in home prices were unlikely.  (Testimony to Congress on July 20, 2005.) 
   6
embedded in these two sets of compensation packages diverged markedly.  We measure these 
incentives using two proxies.  Pay-risk sensitivity, or vega, is the change in CEO wealth (in 
dollars) with respect to changes in stock return volatility (in annualized standard deviations).  
Pay-performance sensitivity, or delta, is the semi-elasticity of CEO wealth (in dollars) to changes 
in the firm’s stock price (in percent).  As measured by vega (see Figure 2), the risk-taking 
incentives of bank CEOs diverged permanently and substantially from those of non-bank CEOs 
around 2000—about the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 
allowed banks to engage more fully in home mortgage securitization and other nontraditional 
banking activities.
9 
We test whether and to what degree CEO vegas and CEO deltas influenced, or were 
influenced by, business policy decisions at the largest U.S. commercial banking companies 
between 1994 and 2006.  Our multiple-equation model allows for simultaneity among vega, 
delta, and business policies.  We find plentiful evidence to suggest that bank business policies 
are influenced by the incentives present in CEO compensation contracts.  On average, high-vega 
banks generate a larger percentage of their incomes from nontraditional banking activities, invest 
a larger percentage of their assets in private (i.e., subprime or otherwise non-conforming) 
mortgage securitizations and a smaller percentage of their assets in on-balance sheet portfolios of 
real estate loans, and take on more credit risk.  Importantly, this bundle of relatively risky 
                                                 
9 While there were other changes in the executive compensation environment during our sample period (e.g., 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that rule changes at U.S. stock exchanges in 2001 and 2002 aimed at 
enhancing board oversight were associated with reductions in CEO compensation), we focus on the housing bubble 
and the Financial Modernization Act because these were first-order changes in the environment for U.S. commercial 
banking companies.    
   7
business policies also exposes high-vega banks to greater systematic risk, and thus exacerbates 
the financial stress often experienced by banks during macroeconomic downturns.  These 
business policy choices became more responsive to CEO vega in the second half of our sample, 
after Gramm-Leach-Bliley expanded the investment opportunity set for commercial banks.  The 
evidence also suggests that bank boards are influenced by existing bank business policies when 
they set the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation.  These findings are strongest in the 
years following industry deregulation, when the data suggest that compensation committees 
began constraining risk-taking at high-risk banks while encouraging risk-taking at low-risk 
banks, and began providing increased incentives for CEOs to exploit new growth 
opportunities—e.g., by encouraging management to shift from traditional on-balance sheet 
portfolio lending to investments in private-issue mortgage-backed securities and nontraditional 
fee-generating activities.       
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I discusses the transactions 
banking model central to the expansion of mortgage credit in the U.S. and how the adoption of 
this model has affected bank financial performance.  Section II reviews the relevant literature on 
executive compensation and risk-taking.  Section III presents our empirical model, defines the 
variables we use to specify the model, and identifies the specific hypotheses we are testing.  
Section IV describes the data.  Section V reports our empirical results.  Section VI summarizes 
the findings and discusses their implications. 
I.  Transactions banking   8
U.S. commercial banking companies have grown immensely larger over the past two 
decades, due mainly to the confluence of three factors.  First, innovations in financial markets 
and information technologies created new options for depositors and savers (e.g., money market 
mutual funds, 401K plans, discount brokerage) and borrowers (e.g., commercial paper, high-
yield debt, OTC stock markets) and set in motion a process of disintermediation that threatened 
to make the heavily regulated U.S. banking sector obsolete.  Second, federal deregulation 
allowed banks to expand their geographic footprints across state lines (the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) and expand into non-banking products such as 
investment banking, brokerage, and insurance sales and underwriting (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999).  Third, a scale-intensive business model, often 
referred to as “transactions banking,” emerged.  This new banking business model is based on 
new channels of information (credit bureaus), new financial processes (asset securitization) and 
generates high volumes of noninterest (fee-based) income for banking companies that grow large 
enough to efficiently implement it.   
Transactions banking embraces financial disintermediation.  Banks use their traditional 
expertise in loan underwriting to originate loans, but instead of issuing deposits to fund these 
loans on-balance sheet they (or their investment bank partners) issue securities to fund large 
pools of loans in off-balance sheet loan securitizations.  Loan securitizations are investment 
trusts that purchase existing home mortgage loans (or auto loans, credit card receivables, etc.) 
using funds raised by selling mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) to third-party investors; these 
investors are usually other financial institutions who want exposure to the risks and returns of   9
diversified pools of mortgage loans without having to generate these loans themselves.   
Securitization allows banks to sell their otherwise illiquid loans and use the proceeds to fund 
additional loans—in a sense, recycling bank capital.  Banks earn fee income from originating, 
securitizing, and servicing the loans, while MBS investors receive all the interest payments and 
principal repayments.  Depending on the terms of the securitization, the originating or 
securitizing banks may hold a portion of the MBSs themselves or provide recourse agreements to 
MBS investors.       
Well over half of all U.S. residential mortgage debt is securitized by, guaranteed by, or 
held in the portfolios of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and Ginnie Mae.  Most of the MBSs issued by these GSEs are relatively safe and easy-to-
understand “pass-through” securities: the pooled mortgages are either backed by government 
guarantees, private insurance, or large down payments, and the interest and principal cash flows 
are shared equally by the investors.
10  But investors in private (non-GSE) mortgage-backed 
securities can bear substantial risk.  These MBS are backed by pools of loans with different and 
potentially riskier characteristics: large (jumbo) principals, low down payments, no mortgage 
insurance, low borrower creditworthiness (subprime loans) or incomplete documentation of 
borrower income (low-doc or “Alt-A” loans). 
                                                 
10 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac initially securitized or held only conforming mortgages (non-jumbo first mortgages 
with either 20% down payments or private mortgage insurance), as because of this were permitted to operate with 
very little capital; moreover, their lines of credit at the U.S. Treasury created the perception that they were “too-big-
to-fail,” which gave them a funding advantage over their private-sector competitors.  But in response to political and 
regulatory pressure to make mortgage credit available to low- and moderate-income home buyers, both Fannie and 
Freddie began purchasing and holding MBSs backed by non-conforming loans.  As these investments soured in the 
mid-2000s and the GSEs reached the verge of insolvency, the Treasury Department made good on its “implicit 
government guarantee” by injecting equity funding and nationalizing ownership of the two GSEs.     10
Transactions banks gain access to enormous economies of scale (Hughes, Lang, Mester, 
and Moon (1996), Rossi (1998)) associated with the collection and analysis of the “hard,” 
quantifiable borrower information central to the automated lending processes used to evaluate, 
originate, and pool large volumes of retail loans (Stein (2002)).  But because transactions banks 
all have access to the same information (e.g., credit scores) and all produce non-differentiated 
financial commodities such as mortgage loans and credit card loans, price competition is intense 
and profit margins are tight.  Hence, transactions banks have strong incentives to grow larger in 
order to exploit further unit cost reductions.  Once external growth options (i.e., acquiring other 
transactions banks) are exhausted, internal growth requires increasing the number of loan 
originations, which creates an incentive to relax lending standards and make loans to less 
creditworthy borrowers.  This incentive is exacerbated by the fact that, in this business model, 
loan underwriting is separated from both loan monitoring and the bearing of credit risk.  Aside 
from the reduction in idiosyncratic credit risk associated with loan pooling, and any recourse 
arrangements with the originating or securitizing banks, MBS investors bear the bulk of the 
credit risk in this model, and given the information problems associated with pools comprised of 
hundreds or thousands of individual loans, these investors typically cede the task of evaluating 
risk to third-party securities rating firms.     
Large banking companies have become more reliant on noninterest income over time—in 
large part because of the shift from originate-and-hold banking to originate-and-securitize 
banking, but also from expansion into new fee-based lines of business made accessible by 
industry deregulation such as securities underwriting and brokerage.  This shift has tended to   11
increase the volatility of bank earnings and banks’ exposure to systematic risk.  DeYoung and 
Roland (2001) show that (non-deposit-related) fee income is associated with higher revenue 
volatility, higher operating leverage, and higher earnings volatility at U.S. commercial banks.  
DeYoung and Rice (2004) find that marginal increases in non-interest income are associated 
with a worsening of banks’ risk-return trade-off.  Stiroh (2004a, 2004b) finds no evidence of 
diversification gains at banks that combine interest and non-interest income.  Choi, DeYoung, 
and Hasan (2006) find that noninterest income at commercial banking companies in 42 different 
countries is strongly and positively related to systematic risk.  Clark, Dick, Hirtle, Stiroh, and 
Williams (2007) emphasize how the increasingly retail-focused strategies of large U.S. banking 
companies expose these banks to economic and business cycle volatility.  Elysiani and Wang 
(2008) demonstrate that noninterest income makes it more difficult for analysts to forecast the 
quarterly earnings of banking companies.   
While the headlines in the financial press have justifiably dwelled on the over $2 trillion 
of capital losses suffered by banks and other investors in sub-prime mortgage-backed securities, 
transactions banking companies have also experienced material, and in some cases crippling, 
reductions in fee income as investor demand for new MBS dried up and household demand for 
both new and existing houses declined.  Total noninterest income in the U.S. banking industry 
fell from 43% to 38% of operating income between 2006 and the first three quarters of 2008, the 
largest two-year decline since the mid-1970s.  Many of the largest financial institutions with 
non-diversified, “mono-line” mortgage banking strategies failed (e.g., American Home 
Mortgage, New Century Financial, Countrywide Financial, Washington Mutual, Golden West-  12
Wachovia) due to the combined impact of plummeting fee income and large losses in their 
portfolios of subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.    
II. Executive Compensation 
The manner in which corporate managers are compensated can shape their incentives, 
and delta and vega are two important measures of those incentives (Core and Guay (2002)).  
Vega, or pay-risk sensitivity, captures the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 0.01 
change in stock return volatility.  Typically, including a large amount of stock option grants in 
CEO compensation packages will result in high vega.  Delta, or pay-performance sensitivity, 
measures the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 1% change in stock price.   
Typically, including a large amount of stock grants (and to a lesser extent, stock option grants) in 
CEO compensation packages will result in high delta.   
The impact of delta on manager incentives is not straightforward.  As a first principle, 
high-delta compensation reduces conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders by 
linking manager wealth to the value of the firm’s stock (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997, 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2001)).  But high-delta compensation may over time 
concentrate managerial wealth in the shares of the firm and create new principal-agent problems.  
The primary concern is that poorly diversified managers with high deltas may become risk-
averse and pass up positive-NPV projects that carry high absolute levels of risk (Smith and Stulz 
(1985)).  However, shareholding managers can benefit along with the other equity investors if 
risk is shifted to debt-holders, and the extent to which such shifting is possible gives high-delta   13
managers an incentive to take more risk (John and John (1993)); this may be an especially 
legitimate concern in our study, given that asset substitution problems can be more serious in 
banks where a large portion of debt is in the form of deposit contracts guaranteed by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).   
The impact of vega on manager incentives is more clear.  Because it rewards stock return 
volatility, high-vega compensation should make risk more valuable to managers and mitigates 
potential managerial risk aversion (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Smith and Stulz (1985)).   
Several studies provide evidence that high-vega compensation encourages riskier policy choices 
while high-delta compensation encourages less risky policy choices (Knopf, Nam, and Thornton 
(2002), Rogers (2002), Nam, Ottoo, and Thornton (2003), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). 
Vega and delta are not necessarily exogenous.  Boards are likely to set the parameters of 
CEO compensation in conjunction with the business policies put in place by managers, either to 
complement those policies or to influence the amount of risk managers take in the 
implementation of those policies.  For example, firms that face growing market demand might 
choose high-vega compensation to encourage the risk-taking necessary to grow the firm rapidly 
and take advantage of the new investment opportunities.  Guay (1999) suggests that firms with 
more growth options are more likely to have high-vega contracts.  Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006) further show that vega increases in R&D expenditures, firm focus, and leverage, while 
vega decreases in investments in plant assets.  Ge’czy, Minton and Schrand (2007) find that 
firms for which speculation (in interest rates, exchange rates, etc.) is a core business activity tend 
to use incentive-aligning compensation and bonding arrangements for their managers.   14
The empirical evidence cited so far comes from studies of non-financial firms; as noted 
by Macey and O’Hara (2003, p.91), “very little attention has been paid to the corporate 
governance of banks.”  This is likely due to the fact that, until recently, federal and state banking 
laws had tightly controlled banks’ risk-taking opportunities and strictly limited competition 
among banks.  Absent risk-taking opportunities, executive compensation in the banking industry 
traditionally has not been structured to encourage risk-taking (Smith and Watts (1992), Houston 
and James (1995)).  This appears to have changed with industry deregulation, which expanded 
banks’ investment opportunities by allowing them to expand into new geographic markets (the 
Reigle-Neal Act of 1994) and provide non-commercial banking financial services such as 
investment banking, securities brokerage, and insurance sales and underwriting (the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999).  As discussed above, the data in Figure 2 strongly suggest that bank 
boards reshaped the risk-taking incentives of bank CEOs beginning around 1999 or 2000, 
consistent with encouraging executives to exploit new non-commercial banking growth options. 
The nature of the bank production function—coupled with the responses of government 
regulation to the externalities endemic to that production technology—has had a profound effect 
on the governance environment at banks (Macey and O’Hara (2003)).  Banks create liquidity for 
the economy by financing illiquid assets with liquid (in fact, payable upon demand) deposit 
liabilities.  This production process can become unstable, with potentially dire consequences for 
the macro-economy, should depositors demand their funds en masse, i.e., a “bank run.”  While 
the provision of government deposit insurance has for all intents and purposes eliminated the 
threat of bank runs in the U.S., it has also (a) reduced depositor incentives to monitor bank   15
management, (b) greatly increased banks’ capacities to take on financial leverage, and (c) 
increased the incentives for managers of financially troubled to invest in high-risk, negative net 
present value projects.  Hostile takeovers are virtually absent from the banking industry (due to 
regulatory restrictions and approvals for large bank ownership stakes), eliminating another 
source of external monitoring and discipline of bank management.  Thus, unlike most 
corporations, at banks the government supervisors perform an important monitoring function for 
outside shareholders.  Against this backdrop, Adams and Mehran (2003) find that the corporate 
governance structures at bank holding companies between 1986 and 1999 were substantially 
different than those at other corporations: banking companies had larger boards with more 
outside directors, had less institutional ownership, and paid their CEOs relatively larger cash 
compensation (salary and bonus) but relatively smaller stock grants and stock options grants. 
Only a small number of studies have examined the pay-performance and pay-risk 
sensitivities of bank CEO compensation and/or the impact of those sensitivities on bank risk-
taking and bank financial performance.  A clear pattern has yet to develop in this literature.  
Hubbard and Palia (1995) find stronger pay-performance relationships in deregulated interstate 
banking markets where investment opportunities are arguably greater.  Chen, Steiner, and Whyte 
(2006) find that option-based compensation was positively related to market-based risk measures 
at U.S. banks during the 1990s.  Minnick, Unal and Yang (2009) study acquisitions made by 
U.S. banking companies between 1991 and 2005, and find that mergers are more likely to be 
value-enhancing, and post-acquisition operating performance more likely to be strong, when 
CEOs have high pay-performance compensation.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find no   16
systematic relationship between CEO stock option compensation and U.S. banking company 
performance during the financial crisis in 2008, but do find a negative cross-sectional 
relationship between performance and CEO stock grant compensation.   
III. Model 
Our main focus is on the interplay of CEO vega and bank policy choices—however, we 
also include CEO delta in our tests, because managers will obviously react to all of the 
incentives embedded in their contracts.  As discussed above, the relationships between and 
among these three variables are complex, and we test them in a fully endogenous and 
simultaneous system of equations: 
Policyt =  f( lnVegat , lnDeltat , lnAssets t-1, lnMBt-1, Equity ratio t-1 , EconCond t  , Year t)       (1) 
lnVegat =  f( Policyt , lnDeltat ,  lnAssets t-1, lnMBt-1, Equity ratio t-1 ,, lnSalaryt , Year t)        (2) 
lnDeltat =  f( Policyt , lnVegat ,   lnAssets t-1, lnMBt-1, Equity ratio t-1 , Tenuret  , Year t)       (3) 
where t indexes time and the index for individual banks is suppressed for convenience.  Policy is 
any one of ten separate bank performance or product mix measures conventionally associated 
with high risk.  We provide a detailed description for each of the Policy variables below.  Vega 
and Delta are CEO wealth sensitivity measures estimated annually for each bank using the “one-
year approximation method” described below.  Because the estimated variables have 
distributions heavily skewed to the right, we specify them in natural logs as lnVegat and lnDeltat.     17
We employ a parsimonious specification.
11  Each of the equations include three common 
control variables, observed at the beginning of time t:  the log of total assets (lnAssets) accounts 
for differences in firm size, the log of the market-to-book equity ratio (lnMB) accounts for 
differences in bank-specific investment opportunities, and the ratio of book equity to assets 
(Equity ratio) accounts for differences in financial leverage across firms.  Each of the equations 
also contains a unique control variable.  The Policy regression (1) includes a market-weighted 
economic conditions variable (EconCondt) which varies over time with economic conditions and 
varies across banks based on the percentage of their deposits raised in each of the states in which 
they operate branches.
12  We expect banks facing stronger (weaker) economic conditions will 
have more (less) leeway for choosing risky business policies.  The Vega regression (2) includes 
the natural log of CEO salary (lnSalary).  Cash compensation allows the CEO to diversify 
outside the firm, thus reducing risk aversion and permitting lower risk-taking incentives (Guay 
(1999)) or may be an indication of CEO entrenchment, thus inducing risk aversion and requiring 
higher risk-taking incentives (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997)); we have no a priori 
expectation for the sign on this variable.  The Delta regression (3) includes the number of years 
that the current CEO has held his/her position (Tenure).  Prior studies have shown that 
                                                 
11 We estimated several alternative versions of the model (1), (2) and (3) that used different right-hand side 
identifications schemes.  For example, in one of these schemes we added a proxy for Monitoring Cost to (2) and 
retained Salary in (1).  Although our main tests of interest were robust to these and other changes in specification, 
these alternative models did not always pass statistical tests of identification.  The results from these alternative 
regression specifications are available upon request; given that our tables already contain results from 90 separate 
regressions, we chose not to report the alternative specification results in order to conserve space.      
12 The EconCond variable is defined differently across the ten versions of our model, but is always constructed from 
one of the following three different state-level data sources: the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Coincident 
Index of economic conditions for each state; the per-capita income for each state; and the payroll employment 
percentage for each state.  Details available upon request.          18
compensation committees are more likely to provide CEOs with high-delta contracts when the 
approach of CEO retirement creates horizon problems (Core and Guay (1999)).  A vector of year 
dummies (Year) is included in all three equations. 
In order to simplify our discussion of the expected signs on the Policy, Vega, and Delta 
coefficients in our model, we make the following reasonable presumptions: (a) bank risk is 
increasing in each of our Policy measures, (b) CEO risk-taking incentives are increasing in Vega, 
and (c) CEO risk-taking incentives are decreasing in Delta.  The first presumption merely 
requires that both CEOs and bank boards believed the policy in question to be risk-increasing at 
the time it was implemented.  The second presumption is not controversial.  The third 
presumption arguably holds as a first principle, although as discussed above theoretical 
exceptions exist.   
A. Policy equation 
  We use ten different definitions of the Policy variable to estimate the model: seven are 
narrow business policy variables commonly associated with relatively risky investment choices 
by banks, and three are broad market measures that capture the overall riskiness of banks’ 
policies.  Noninterest is total noninterest income and Noninterest Less is total noninterest income 
less fees from traditional fiduciary and depositor service activities; each measure is scaled by net 
operating income (i.e., noninterest income + interest income – interest expense).
13  Based on the 
findings in the extant literature on noninterest income (e.g., DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh 
                                                 
13 More detailed data on banks’ noninterest income from nontraditional banking activities such as loan 
securitization, loan servicing, investment banking, brokerage, trading, venture capital, and insurance underwriting, 
or detailed data on banks’ derivatives holdings, did not become available until 2001.       19
(2006), Elysiani and Wang (2008)), and assuming that bank managers during our sample period 
understood the risks embedded in these activities, we expect noninterest income to be a risk-
increasing activity on average and thus positively related to Vega in equation (1).   
Commercial, Commercial RE, and Mortgage are, respectively, commercial and industrial 
loans, commercial real estate loans, and 1-to-4 family mortgage loans scaled by bank assets.  
These three categories of loans have been linked to high levels of risk at banks—commercial 
loans traditionally have the highest default rates, commercial real estate loan defaults tend to 
spike during recessions, and mortgage defaults are at the root of the current financial crisis—
which suggests a positive association with Vega in equation (1).  However, during our sample 
period large banks increasingly shifted credit risk off their balance sheets and onto their income 
statements via securitization and other methods (Stiroh (2004a, 2004b, and 2006)) which, 
depending on the extent of this risk shifting, could offset or even reverse the expected positive 
relationship.  We measure the overall riskiness of the loans banks hold on-balance sheet with 
annual provisions for loan and lease losses (Provisions) scaled by total assets, and expect a 
positive association with Vega in equation (1).
14   
Losses in mortgage-backed securities investments were a central element in the financial 
and banking crisis of 2007-2009.  Private MBS is the fair value of private mortgage 
securitizations held on-balance sheet, scaled by assets.  (We get nearly identical results using the 
amortized book values of these investments.)  Private MBS are backed by pools of sub-prime, 
                                                 
14 All measures of loan quality derived from bank financial statements are flawed.  We choose loan loss provisions 
because it reflects expected loan losses on recent loan investment decisions (compared with the allocation for loan 
losses, which includes expected losses for both recent and past loan investment decisions) and because it is more of 
an ex ante measure of risk (compared with loan charge-offs, which is a pure ex post measure of risk).       20
Alt-A, jumbo, or other non-conforming mortgages, and as such they were known to be at least 
somewhat riskier investments than agency MBS (i.e., those issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
or Ginnie Mae) that are backed by conforming mortgages.
15  If bank managers understood that 
these investments entailed large amounts of credit risk, then we expect investments in private 
MBS products to be positively related to Vega in equation (1).   
In addition to these seven narrow measures of business policy, we also include three 
broad measures of market risk measures which might reflect the overall riskiness of banks’ 
business policies.  Total Risk is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the year in 
question, Systematic Risk is the market returns slope coefficient (beta) estimated from a three-
factor model (market return, yield on 3-month Treasuries, 2-year to 10-year yield spread on 
Treasuries), and Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from the market 
model.
16  Return volatility can be driven by either idiosyncratic or systematic events, we expect 
all three market risk measures to be positively related to Vega in equation (1).
17  
Given that the compensation literature (discussed above) provides ambiguous theoretical 
predictions about the relationship between delta and CEO risk-taking incentives, our 
expectations for the sign on the Delta coefficient in equation (1) are not as strong as those just 
stated for Vega.  Nonetheless, based on our maintained assumption (c), we expect the coefficient 
                                                 
15 Conforming mortgages have small principal amounts and loan-to-value ratio no more than 80% (or carry private 
mortgage insurance).  A third category of mortgage-backed security is the so-called structured MBS, which is 
essentially an MBS that is backed by a pool of other MBSs.  Structured MBS contracts are idiosyncratic—
depending on the terms of the contract, investors are exposed to various amounts of credit risk and/or prepayment 
risk—and we exclude these investments from our study because they are held by a relatively small percentage of the 
banks in our sample.          
16 All of the results on our main tests were robust to using either a one-factor or two-factor market model.   
17 For example, Meulbroek (2001) and Duan and Wei (2005) find that the value of executive stock options increases 
with systematic risk after controlling for total risk.     21
on Delta to be negative in all ten specification of equation (1), just the opposite of our expected 
positive coefficients on Vega in those regressions.   
We note that our Policy variables focus exclusively on banks’ business policy 
(investment) decisions, and that we do not explore banks’ financial policy decisions.  At 
depository intermediaries, the type and duration of liabilities are determined in large part by the 
type and duration of assets; that is, the investment decision and the financing decision are clearly 
not independent.  At large banks like those in our data, liability mix tends to be determined by 
bank size (DeYoung, Hunter, and Udell (2004), Table A1) and by bank business policy choices 
(DeYoung and Yom (2008)) and, hence, is less likely to be a primary driver of risk.
18  Focusing 
on just one type of policy decision also allows us to keep the model specification relatively 
simple and tractable. 
B. Vega and Delta equations 
A negative sign on Policy in equation (2) would indicate that bank boards provide fewer 
risk-taking incentives for CEOs (lower Vega) at banks with strategies that feature large 
investments in that particular (risky) business policy.  A positive sign on Policy in equation (3) 
would indicate that bank boards attempt to align CEO more closely with shareholders (higher 
Delta) at banks with strategies that feature large investments in that particular (risky) business 
policy.  Either or both of these findings would provide evidence that bank boards have been 
                                                 
18 DeYoung and Yom (2008) find that, for large and medium-size U.S. commercial banks between 1990 and 2005, 
the cross-sectional variation in asset mix is substantially better at explaining the cross-sectional variation in liability 
mix than vice versa.  They find little difference in the direction of this association for small banks, for which the 
deposit franchise is often an important driver of business policy.  The authors also find that, regardless of the causal 
direction, the correlations between asset mix and liability mix become stronger as banks grow larger.       22
using executive compensation incentives to limit or constrain risk taking.  An opposite finding (a 
positive sign on Policy in equation (2) and/or a negative sign on Policy in equation (3)) would 
provide evidence that bank boards have been using executive compensation incentives to 
reinforce or support increased risk taking.     
It is logical to think that bank boards will set CEO incentives holistically.  A positive sign 
on Delta in equation (2) and/or a positive sign on Vega in equation (3) would indicate that bank 
boards use these incentive parameters in an offsetting fashion, for example, tempering high-vega 
incentives to increase the second moment of the stock price distribution with high-delta 
incentives to increase the first moment of the stock price distribution.     
IV. Data 
Our sample is based on the intersection of the ExecuComp database and the Federal 
Reserve Y-9C database in 1994 through 2006.  ExecuComp reports top executive compensation 
information extracted from the annual proxy statements for large, publicly traded U.S. 
corporations; we estimate our key variables Vega and Delta from these data.  The Y-9Cs report 
quarterly financial statement data for large U.S. bank holding companies; we extract most of our 
Policy variables and control variables from the cumulative year-end December 31 reports.  We 
start out with 141 commercial banking companies (SIC code 6020) that appear in ExecuComp 
during any of the years of our sample period, which generates a total of 1,057 bank-year 
observations.  A relatively small number of observations are lost when we merge the two 
databases, lag some of the variables by one year, and estimate Vega and Delta.  As shown in 
Table I, our final sample includes 881 bank-year observations of 134 different banks run by 200   23
different CEOs between 1994 and 2006.  We augmented these data with bank stock prices from 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, macroeconomic conditions data 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and interest rate data from the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
Table II presents summary statistics for the variables in our model.  To reduce the 
influence of extreme values, the distributions of all variables are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th 
percentiles of their sample distributions.  Following Core and Guay (2002), we use the “one-year 
approximation” method to generate annual estimates of Vega and Delta.
19  Vega has a mean 
(median) of $179,978 ($63,334), and Delta has a mean (median) of $754,592 ($361,383).  In 
other words, the typical bank CEO enjoys an increase of $63,334 in his/her equity portfolio for a 
0.01 increase in stock return volatility, and an increase of $361,383 for a 1% increase in stock 
price.  The average CEO in the sample has about 9 years of tenure in the position and earns 
$5.53 million in total annual compensation—approximately $841,000 in salary, $1.16 million in 
bonus, $2.00 million in option grants, and $825,000 in restricted stock.  The sample banks are 
substantially larger than the typical U.S. commercial bank—mean (median) Assets is 
approximately $66 billion ($20 billion) measured in 2006 dollars—and with average Noninterest 
of 36% rely far more on fee-generating activities for income than the typical U.S. bank.  The 
                                                 
19 We value CEO stock options using the Black-Scholes (1973) model modified by Merton (1973) to account for 
dividends payouts, based on data from only the current year’s proxy statement or annual report. Vega is the partial 
derivative of the option value with respect to stock-return volatility, multiplied by 0.01 times the number of options.  
Delta equals delta from options plus delta from stock holdings: delta from options is the partial derivative of the 
option value with respect to stock price, multiplied by 1% of the current stock price times the number of options; 
delta from stock holdings is simply the product of 1% of the current stock price and the number of shares.    24
typical loan portfolio is relatively balanced between Commercial,  Commercial RE, and 
Mortgage loans (about 14%, 15%, and 17% of assets on average).  Although Private MBS 
holdings are small on average, the top quartile of banks invest heavily in these assets.  Provisions 
for loan losses are low—less than 1% on average—reflecting the relatively good banking climate 
during most of the years in our sample, but the standard deviation is relatively large.  
[Insert Table II about here] 
Table III, Panel A reports correlations between the ten Policy  variables, the overall 
market risk measures (Total Risk, Systematic Risk, Idiosyncratic Risk), and the CEO incentive 
variables lnVega and lnDelta.
20  Consistent with our expectations, fee-based income, investments 
in commercial loans and private MBS, and expected loan write-offs are all positively correlated 
with market risk, with the fee income measures more closely associated with systematic risk 
(DeYoung and Roland (2001), Choi, DeYoung, and Hasan (2006), Clark, Dick, Hirtle, Stiroh, 
and Williams (2007)) and the portfolio investment measures associated more closely with 
idiosyncratic risk.  Despite their historical links to episodes of widespread bank failure, both 
commercial real estate loans and 1-to-4 family mortgage loans are negatively correlated with 
market risk.  This likely reflects the relatively stable and predictable cash flows generated by 
these lines of business except during real estate downturns, combined with the fact that, prior to 
the 2007-2009 recession, real estate downturns had been regional phenomena and hence large 
banks could expect to diversify away much of the credit risk associated with these loans.
21   
                                                 
20 The table display Pearson correlations.  Results are similar for Spearman correlations. 
21 This is in contrast to small banks that hold non-diversified portfolios of local commercial real estate loans which, 
as a result, historically comprise the largest percentage of bank insolvencies.   25
[Insert Table III about here] 
Although high-vega and high-delta compensation theoretically impart very different 
incentives on CEOs, lnVega and lnDelta have identical qualitative correlations with each of the 
ten  Policy  variables.  Fee income, loan provisions, MBS holdings, and systematic risk are 
positively correlated with both of the CEO incentive measures, while commercial real estate 
loans, mortgage loans, and idiosyncratic risk are negatively correlated with both of the CEO 
incentive measures.  These correlation patterns suggest that, when bank boards embed strong 
wealth incentives in CEO compensation packages, they tend to include both high-vega and high-
delta incentives together.  Of course, these patterns come from simple bivariate tests, so it is 
possible that one or more outside variables not controlled for in these tests are driving the 
observed patterns.  Moreover, these simple statistical tests shed little light on the motivations of 
bank compensation committees. 
Our main test variables exhibit a considerable amount of autocorrelation as well.  By 
definition, bank business policies cannot change much from year-to-year: charting a business 
strategy requires fixed investments in expertise, location, inter-firm contracting, marketing, and 
customer relationships.  The incentives embedded in CEO contracts should exhibit similar 
inertia:  once CEOs have had a few years of tenure they will have accumulated large portfolios 
of stock and options, and annual increments to those portfolios will not alter the values of Delta 
and  Vega much at the margin.
22  As shown in Table III, Panel B, the average annual 
autocorrelation coefficients for Vega,  Delta and six of the ten Policy variables indicate 
                                                 
22 Ofek and Yermak (2000) show that equity compensation is a more effective tool when CEOs have low equity 
stakes.   26
substantial persistence, ranging between 0.51 and 0.72 for CEOs with five or more years at their 
banks.  Predictably, Provisions, Private MBS and NoninterestLess all exhibit less persistence 
(ranging between 0.38 and 0.49); loan quality varies with the business cycle, while both Private 
MBS and NoninterestLess were relatively new product lines that many banks were still working 
into their business strategies during our sample period.  Only Systematic Risk exhibits little 
persistence over time.   
V.  Model estimation and results 
Repeated and non-trivial changes in the corporate governance environments of our 
sample banks influence the manner in which we estimate our model.  Our 1994-2006 data 
includes 134 different banking companies, although only 3 of these firms existed in all 13 years 
of the data with the same CEO.  Collectively, these 134 banks employed 200 different CEOs 
during the sample period, and 61 of these 134 banks made at least one acquisition during the 
sample period that increased asset size by 25% or greater.  For the 51 CEO changes for which we 
have complete compensation information, the average incoming CEO’s Delta was 10.9% lower 
than the average outgoing CEO’s Delta, consistent with a change in governance in which new 
CEOs have different incentives than long-time CEOs.  (The change in Vega around CEO 
changes was non-significant.)  For the 22 largest and most acquisitive banks in our sample (i.e., 
banks with assets of at least $50 billion that increased their size by at least 25% via acquisition in 
one year), Vega was 14.4% higher in the year of the acquisition relative to the year prior to the 
acquisition, consistent with a change in governance in which CEOs of large/growing banks face   27
different incentives than other CEOs.  (The change in Delta around these acquisitions was non-
significant.) 
These complications, combined with the relative bank-level inertia in Policy, Vega, and 
Delta discussed above, rule out a standard fixed-bank effects panel estimation approach.  We 
apply three alternative treatments to the panel data.
23  In the first approach we simply pool the 
unbalanced data panel.  In the second approach we impose a 3-lag Newey-West autocorrelation 
structure at the CEO-level.  The third (and our preferred) approach combines the first two 
approaches, pooling the data for CEOs who engaged in major acquisitions during the sample 
period but imposing the 3-lag Newey-West structure for CEOs who did not.
24  In all cases, we 
estimate the system of equations (1), (2) and (3) using standard two-stage general method of 
moments estimation with instrumental variables (IV/2SGMM).  Each equation is estimated 
individually, using the full set of exogenous right-hand side variables from the three-equation 
system as instruments for the two right-hand side endogenous variables.  The system is exactly 
identified in the mechanical sense that the number of exclusions equals the number of equations; 
as described above, we exclude Salary and Tenure from equation (1), EconCond and Tenure 
from equation (2), and EconCond and Salary from equation (3).   
                                                 
23 We also performed Fama-McBeth estimation (results not displayed, available upon request).  The signs and 
magnitudes of the test coefficients are highly robust to this approach, but the small number of annual cross-sections 
in our data (T=13) make statistical inference difficult.   
24 We choose 3 lags for the Newey-West autocorrelation structure based on the distribution of the CEO tenure 
variable.  Of the 202 chief executives at our sample banks, 170 ran their banks for 7 years or less.  According to 
Petersen (2009, ft. 18), in the standard application of Newey-West a lag length of M implies that one allows a 
correlation between the error terms of observations t and t-k, where k runs from –M to M. Thus, if we use 3 lags in 
Newey-West estimation, the autocorrelation structure completely covers 84% of the CEOs in our sample.   28
We estimate 90 different versions of the model: ten different Policy variables, three 
different panel data treatments, three different model specifications/sub-samples.  This generates 
a large volume of results, so to conserve space we report only the estimated coefficients for the 
Policy,  lnVega, and lnDelta variables in Table IV (full sample), Table V (sub-sample that 
excludes the largest banks) and Table VI (full sample, testing for post-1999 effects).  However, 
we do display the complete results for one full-sample version of the model (in which Policy = 
Systematic Risk) in Appendix Table A-II.  The control variable coefficients and the diagnostic 
test results displayed there are reasonably representative of those obtained for the other Policy 
specifications (not shown here, but available upon request).  As can be seen in Table A-II, 
system under-identification is rejected at high levels of significance for all the equations.   
One must be careful when interpreting the estimated coefficients in the tables below.  The 
coefficients largely capture cross-sectional variation in the data, not inter-temporal reactions 
within given firms.  For example, a negative coefficient on Commercial in equation (2) would 
indicate that boards at banks with high concentrations of business lending relative to average 
industry levels of business lending tend to set lower than average pay-risk incentives (Vega) for 
their CEOs.   
A. Basic model   
The estimates displayed in Table IV strongly infer that banks’ business policy choices 
and risk profiles were influenced by CEO wealth incentives between 1994 and 2006.  In equation 
(1), high-vega compensation is associated with statistically significant increases in systematic 
and idiosyncratic risk, noninterest income, investment in private mortgage-backed securities, and   29
loan portfolio credit risk—all of which are risk-increasing activities or indicators.  Some of these 
increases are economically substantial.  At the means of the data, a 10% increase in Vega is 
associated with a 2.0% increase in Idiosyncratic Risk, a 2.8% increase in Noninterest, a 3.1% 
increase in Systematic Risk, a 3.5% increase in NoninterestLess, a 6.7% increase in Provisions, 
and a 21.9% increase in Private MBS.
25  (The last of these estimates is clearly too large: Since 
about one-in-three observations of Private MBS are zeros, we re-estimated using Tobit-IV 
techniques and found a smaller yet still substantial 10.3% increase in Private MBS for a 10% 
increase in Vega.  Results available upon request.)  Not all of the Policy variables increased with 
Vega: a 10% increase in Vega is associated with statistically significant 2.1% and 3.2% 
decreases, respectively, in Mortgage and Commercial RE.  Collectively, these results infer that 
risk-seeking bank management shifts away from traditional portfolio lending and toward less 
traditional investment and off-balance sheet activities.  
[Insert Table IV about here] 
High-delta compensation affects business policy less often and somewhat less 
substantially.  A 10% increase in Delta is associated with statistically significant decreases in 
risk—a 3.3% decrease in NoninterestLess, a 2.9% decrease in Noninterest, a 1.4% decrease in 
Commercial, and a 1.1% decrease in Systematic Risk—suggesting that bank boards provide 
offsetting pay-performance and pay-risk incentives for some activities.  Similarly, a 10% 
increase in Delta is associated with statistically significant 8.1% and 2.8% increases, 
                                                 
25 An example of these calculations:  Given the semi-log regression specification, the estimated coefficient 0.286 is 
interpreted as the unit change in Systematic Risk associated with the percent change in Vega.  Thus, 
0.286*0.10/0.909 = 0.03146 = 3.1% gives the result, where 0.909 is the sample mean of Systematic Risk.      30
respectively, in Private MBS and Commercial RE.  (Note, however, that the Private MBS result 
becomes statistically non-significant in IV-Tobit estimation.)   
There is a sensible symmetry in these results.  CEOs with high pay-performance 
incentives (high-delta banks) tend to expand investment in lower risk activities and away from 
activities less well understood by investors.  Within their loan portfolios, high-delta banks reduce 
their exposure to systematic risk by substituting commercial real estate loans for general (non-
real estate) business loans; outside their loan portfolio, high-delta banks generate smaller 
portions of their income from difficult-to-value noninterest activities (Elysiani and Wang 
(2008)), which also tends to reduce their exposure to systematic risk.  Thus, the results suggest 
that high pay-performance sensitivity creates incentives for bank executives to run relatively 
traditional banking models.  In contrast, CEOs with high pay-risk incentives (high-vega banks) 
choose policies more consistent with modern transactions banking models: more reliant on 
noninterest income and the systematic risk that comes with it (Clark, Dick, Hirtle, Stiroh, and 
Williams (2007)) and less reliant on traditional portfolio lending.  Also note that the strong 
positive relationship between lnVega and lnAssets in Table A-II (a result that obtains in all 
estimations of the lnVega equation) is consistent with the large size required by the transactions 
banking model.       
We find less evidence that bank boards take existing bank business policies into account 
when setting CEO wealth incentives.  In the case of Vega, interpreting this scant evidence is 
straightforward.  The Policy variable carries a statistically significant coefficient in equation (2) 
only twice—for Idiosyncratic Risk and Total Risk—and in both cases the coefficient is negative.    31
This suggests that compensation committees at banks with high (low) levels of non-systematic 
risk attempted to constrain (encourage) further non-systematic risk taking by giving their CEOs 
relatively low-vega (high-vega) compensation.  We find no statistically significant evidence that 
individual lines of business were important determinants of Vega in equation (2).  The results are 
quite different  for  Delta.  The Policy variables carry statistically significant coefficients in 
equation (3) only twice—for Noninterest and NoninterestLess—and in each case the coefficient 
is negative.  Why would compensation committees at banks with the highest levels of fee-
generating activities impose low pay-performance sensitivity on their CEOs, i.e., potentially 
weakening CEO alignment with shareholders and/or reducing CEO risk aversion?  There are two 
diametrically possible interpretations.  First, during much of our sample period many banking 
experts mistakenly believed that expanding into fee-based banking was risk-reducing (DeYoung 
and Roland (2001) and hence boards may have been unworried about the risks that we now know 
are associated with these lines of business.  Second, compensation committees at transactions 
banks (i.e., high amounts of noninterest income) may have offered low-delta contracts to 
encourage further risk taking.  The tests reported below in Table VII help us differentiate 
between these two possibilities. 
The most consistent result in equations (2) and (3) is the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on lnVega in the lnDelta regressions.  This is consistent with our 
observation above from Table III, that is, when banks embed strong wealth incentives in their 
CEO compensation packages they tend to include both high-vega and high-delta incentives.  But 
we note that the symmetric result (a positive coefficient on lnDelta in the lnVega regressions)   32
does not obtain.  Taken together, these results suggest that compensation committees at the banks 
that we study tended to use high-delta contracts to moderate potential CEO risk-taking induced 
by high vegas, but did not tend to use high-vega contracts to moderate potential CEO risk-
aversion induced by high deltas.      
We note that the size distribution of the banks in our sample is skewed heavily to the 
right: the median bank has assets of $20 billion, the mean bank has assets of $66 billion, and the 
largest banks in the sample have over $1 trillion in assets.  It is natural to wonder whether the 
different regulatory treatment received by these “too-big-to-fail” banks alters their risk-taking 
decisions and corporate governance environments.  To test whether our results are driven by 
outlying behaviors at large banks, we re-estimated the models after excluding bank-year 
observations in which banking assets exceeded $100 billion (2006 dollars).  The resulting 
subsample contained 747 annual observations (134 fewer than in Table IV) for 124 different 
banking companies (10 fewer than in Table IV).  The results of this re-estimation (not shown, 
available upon request) are qualitatively, and for the most part quantitatively, no different from 
those in Table IV.     
B. Before and after deregulation 
As shown in Figure 2, the incentive structure of bank CEO compensation diverged from 
the incentive structure in non-bank CEO compensation after 1999.  Bank-CEO vega increased 
markedly, suggesting that bank boards were encouraging executives to exploit the new 
investment opportunities made possible by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and perhaps exacerbated by 
the boom in securitized mortgage lending markets.  To test whether this apparent change in risk-  33
taking incentives influenced bank business policies, we added a Post1999 dummy to the right-
hand side of all three equations in our model, and also interacted with the right-hand side Policy, 
lnVega, and lnDelta variables.  The results of this more flexible specification, which we 
estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS) techniques on pooled time series-cross section 
data, are displayed in Table V.
26  The estimations reveal three general post-1999 patterns: bank 
business policies became more sensitive to the contractual risk-taking incentives of the CEO; 
incentives were put in place to constrain risk-taking at high-risk banks; and incentives were used 
to encourage CEOs to exploit new growth opportunities. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
Column [1] in Table V shows that five of the ten business policies—Idiosyncratic Risk, 
Total Risk,  Noninterest,  NoninterestLess, and Provisions—became both more positively 
associated with vega and more negatively associated with delta after 1999.  This increased 
sensitivity of policy choices to compensation incentives arguably indicates that bank boards 
either became better able to influence, or grew more serious about influencing, the decisions of 
their CEOs.  In either case, these results suggests that bank boards had increased control over 
CEO decision-making, and thus over the riskiness of their banks, after deregulation.  Column [2] 
shows that CEOs choosing high levels of Private MBS, Idiosyncratic Risk and/or Total Risk 
became more likely to receive low-vega compensation after 1999, evidence that bank boards 
were attempting to use pay incentives to constrain risk-taking at banks that held or purchased 
                                                 
26 These simple pooled time series-cross section estimates are most comparable to those displayed in columns [1], 
[4], and [7] in Table IV.  Adding the interaction terms doubled the number of endogenous variables in the equation 
system, and given a lack of good additional instruments this precluded us from performing IV/2SGMM estimation.  
We performed these 2SLS estimations manually, which precluded Newey-West estimation.     34
large amounts of mortgage-backed securities or otherwise engaged in activities that generated 
large amounts of market risk.  In contrast, CEOs choosing high levels of Commercial, Mortgage 
and Provisions became more likely to receive high-vega compensation after 1999; we interpret 
this as encouragement for CEOs at banks with traditional on-balance sheet lending strategies 
(which would yield relatively high levels of loan loss provisions-to-assets, ceteris paribus) to 
take additional off-balance sheet risks, perhaps by pursuing new growth opportunities provided 
by deregulation.  Column [3] indicates that compensation committees at high-vega banks became 
more likely to moderate those risk-taking incentives after 1999 by choosing high deltas.  In 
addition, the results here show that the negative relationship between Delta and the noninterest 
income variables found in Table IV is largely a post-1999 phenomenon, consistent with the 
argument advanced above that bank boards were encouraging their CEOs to take advantage of 
nontraditional fee-based growth opportunities.      
 
VI. Summary, Discussion, and Conclusions 
The huge losses suffered by large U.S. financial institutions that created and invested in 
risky mortgage-backed securities—and the equally huge government equity injections, debt 
guarantees, and liquidity creation aimed at keeping these firms afloat and financial markets 
functioning—have raised the ire of taxpayers and those who represent them.  Public officials 
have responded with a variety of schemes to limit and/or claw back the pay of the financial 
executives who “got us into this mess.”  Although a substantial portion of the government loans 
and capital injections are likely to be paid back, and while the most extreme ex post facto   35
sanctions on employee pay and bonuses may not withstand legal scrutiny, some of the proposed 
interventions have come to pass.  This episode has increased the likelihood of a more permanent 
role for government in monitoring and determining executive pay in publicly traded companies. 
Underlying these efforts to control executive pay is the conventional wisdom that 
corporate risk-taking can be controlled by inserting the proper incentives into executive 
compensation contracts.  We test for evidence to support this conventional wisdom at large U.S. 
commercial banking companies between 1994 and 2006.  We examine whether and how the 
terms of CEO compensation contracts at these firms influenced the business policies of these 
firms, and we simultaneously test whether and how bank boards set the terms of CEO 
compensation conditional on the business policies currently under executed at their banks.  We 
find strong evidence that bank CEOs respond to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking 
more risk; systematic evidence that bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage 
executives to pursue new growth opportunities; and more limited evidence that bank boards set 
CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking.     
On average during our sample period, banks in which CEOs had high pay-risk sensitivity 
(high-vega banks) generated a larger percentage of their incomes from noninterest activities, 
invested a larger percentage of their assets in private (i.e., subprime or otherwise non-
conforming) mortgage securitizations, invested a smaller percentage of their assets in on-balance 
sheet loan portfolios, and took on greater credit risk and greater market risk.  CEO business 
policy decisions became more responsive to pay-risk sensitivity after 1999, when the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act expanded commercial banks’ investment opportunity sets.  Compensation   36
committees also became more responsive to the risk profiles of their banks after 1999, setting 
CEO vega relatively lower at banks with high levels of market risk and/or concentrations of 
private mortgage-backed securities (i.e., constraining risk taking) and setting CEO vega 
relatively higher at banks with traditional portfolio-lending business strategies (i.e., encouraging 
investment in riskier, non-traditional activities).  Throughout the entire sample period, and 
especially after 1999, bank boards balanced the risk-taking incentives of high CEO vegas by 
setting complementarily high values of CEO deltas, perhaps believing that closer alignment of 
executive and shareholder wealth might mitigate excessive CEO risk-taking responses. 
We draw four broad conclusions from these findings.  First, banking executives were 
aware to at least some extent of the risks associated with their investments in private issue MBS; 
our results linking high-vega CEOs to private MBS investments run contrary to the claim that 
banks were misled by over-optimistic ratings on MBS (although such claims may be valid for 
less sophisticated investors).
27  Similarly, our results linking high-vega CEOs to noninterest 
income suggest that large bank executives had become, sometime during our 1994-2006 sample 
period, well aware of the increased risks associated with transactions banking business strategies.  
Second, banking executives respond in economically meaningful ways to the incentives present 
in their compensation contracts.  While this lends some legitimacy to arguments for government 
intervention to limit contractual risk-taking incentives for executives at systemically important 
                                                 
27 Internal rating agency emails from before the time the credit markets deteriorated, discovered and released 
publicly by U.S. congressional investigators, suggest that some rating agency employees suspected at the time that 
lax standards for rating structured credit products would produce negative results.  (U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, 10-12-2008, “Committee Holds Hearings on the Credit Rating 
Agencies and the Financial Crisis,” http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2250.)    37
financial institutions, this is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for such policies.  
Evidence that intervention will be effective (i.e., lead to a net improvement in social welfare) is 
necessary as well.  Moreover, nothing in this study supports such policies for banks that do not 
pose systemic risks.  Third, government intervention to limit risk-taking incentives in financial 
executive compensation contracts could at best strengthen, and at worst interfere with, the 
compensation-based risk mitigation behaviors already being exhibited by bank boards that we 
detect here.  The terms of optimal contract incentives are likely to vary substantially across firms 
and CEOs, while government prescriptions almost by necessity tend to be one-size-fits-all.   
Furthermore, the contractual incentives that we test here were designed by boards to mitigate 
principal-agent problems on the behalf of shareholders, while contractual incentives imposed via 
regulation are presumably aimed at providing public goods (i.e., financial market stability, 
fairness) and could work far differently.  Fourth, putting aside populist arguments that executive 
compensation is too large in the absolute, as well as the argument that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act was a policy misstep, our evidence suggests that bank compensation committees acted 
efficiently, effectively, and prudentially in response to deregulation.  Bank boards altered 
compensation incentives (higher vegas) in hopes that bank executives would take advantage of 
the new growth opportunities put in place by Congress.  So-incented, CEOs exploited those 
opportunities, as evidenced by increased fee-based income from nontraditional activities.  And it 
appears that bank boards attempted to moderate the risk-taking incentives embedded in high-
vega compensation by also including high-delta compensation in those same contracts.   38
In interpreting our 1994-2006 findings, it is important to realize that bank managers were 
making their policy decisions conditional not only on the incentives structured into their 
compensation agreements, but also conditional on their beliefs regarding the risk-return tradeoffs 
associated with their various policy options.  The 2007-2009 financial crisis is likely to have 
changed managers’ understanding of risks and returns in some lines of business.  For example, 
the housing downturn revealed that many mortgage-backed securities were far riskier than 
suggested by either their third-party ratings or their contractual yields; managers’ beliefs about 
the risk-return tradeoffs inherent in MBS are likely to have changed post-downturn.  Thus, our 
1994-2006 tests reflect bank managers’ pre-crisis beliefs about the risk-return qualities of MBS, 
and may only imperfectly capture how their business policy choices will react to contractual risk-
taking incentives in a more informed post-crisis environment.  Similarly, our estimates are based 
on the incomplete pre-crisis understanding of these risk-return tradeoffs by bank boards and 
compensation committees.  Thus, one must be careful when drawing inferences about optimal 
post-crisis policy based on our pre-crisis results.  Proposals to foster macroeconomic stability by 
rolling back banking powers may be misguided, because informed post-crisis managers will 
arguably be better able to implement those powers effectively.  And proposals to constrain risk-
taking by limiting the ability of bank boards to set the terms of executive compensation may also 
be misguided, because informed post-crisis boards will arguably be better able to determine 
efficient incentives.   
Finally, we note that none of these conclusions are meant to extend to non-banking firms.  
Commercial banks are subject to supervisory monitoring that, if not explicitly, implicitly creates   39
extra pressure for boards to mitigate risk-taking managerial behaviors.  Moreover, the level and 
types of risk taken by bank executives, and endorsed by bank compensation committees, during 
the 1990s and 2000s are to some large extent special to the newness of the transactions banking 
business model and the incomplete understanding of the risks inherent in that model and the 
products it created.          40
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Table I Data Structure 
 
This table provides data structure information for the sample of 881 observations from 1994 to 2006. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of observations by year  
 



















Panel B: Number and distribution of banks and CEOs 
 
    number of years that banks or CEOs appear in the data sample 
  Number of banks or CEOs 







Banks 134  6.577  4.172  3  6  10 
CEOs*  200  4.405  3.033  2 4 6 
* 51 banks changed CEOs at least once during the sample period.   
 
 
Panel C: Number and incidence of significant increases in bank size. 
(Significant increase = 25% inflation-adjusted year-to-year increase in assets.)  
 
a.  Number of significant annual increases in asset size* 96
b.  Number of annual observations for CEOs involved with significant increases  496
c.  Mean years between significant increases for CEOs involved with significant increases  (a /b)  5.2
* 61 banks experienced significant increases in asset size at least once during the sample period.     45
Table II Summary statistics 
 
This table provides summary statistics for measures of CEO compensation, bank policy, and bank 
characteristics for the sample of 881 observations from 1994 to 2006. All variable definitions are included 
in Appendix Table A-I. 
 
 
 #  of 
Obs  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile  Median  75th 
Percentile 
Endogenous variables            
Vega ($000s)  881 179.978  283.304  26.006  63.334  197.797 
lnVega  881 4.196  1.580  3.296  4.164  5.292 
Delta ($000s)  881 754.592  1214.490  153.652  361.383  879.189 
lnDelta  881 5.884  1.243  5.041  5.893  6.780 
Total Risk  881 0.017  0.006  0.013  0.016  0.021 
Systematic Risk  881 0.908  0.341  0.677  0.884  1.127 
Idiosyncratic Risk  881 0.015  0.006  0.011  0.013  0.017 
Noninterest  881 0.362  0.165  0.246  0.323  0.432 
NoninterestLess  881 0.207  0.140  0.113  0.168  0.251 
Commercial  881 0.144  0.077  0.092  0.137  0.185 
Commercial RE  881 0.149  0.102  0.077  0.129  0.205 
Mortgage  881 0.172  0.096  0.107  0.168  0.225 
Provisions  881 0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.004 
Private MBS  880 0.016  0.034  0.000  0.001  0.016 
Control variables             
Assets ($000s)  881  65,777,623  132,191,347 7,369,412 20,480,072  57,283,876 
lnAssets  881 16.965  1.363  15.813  16.835  17.864 
MB   881 2.413  0.969  1.720  2.181  2.857 
lnMB  881 1.191  0.262  1.001  1.157  1.350 
Equity Ratio  881 0.083  0.016  0.072  0.081  0.093 
lnSalary  881 6.660  0.394  6.406  6.731  6.939 
Tenure  881 9.005  6.702  4.000  7.000  13.000 
Coincident index  881 134.627  15.169  122.812  136.397  144.882 
Per capita income  881 33.714  4.451  30.795  33.000  36.945 
Payroll employment  881 0.398  0.032  0.376  0.394  0.417 
Addendum: Details of compensation             
Total compensation ($000s)  878 5,525.440  6,191.660  1,734.690  3,144.790  6,712.100 
Salary ($000s)  881 840.532  330.813  604.396  836.936  1,030.930 
Bonus ($000s)  881 1,159.050  1,629.110  246.914  560.000  1,348.310 
Option grants ($000s)  878 2,000.410  3,104.360  205.925  802.539  2,427.320 
Restricted stock grants ($000s)  881 825.407  2,112.990  0  0  656.211 
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Table III Data correlations 
 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients among compensation incentive, risk, and bank policy 
variables, and autocorrelation coefficients for bank policies for the sample of 881 observations from 1994 
to 2006. Panel A reports Pearson correlation coefficients. Penal B reports average autocorrelation 
coefficients for CEO with 5 or more years at their banks.  The average slope coefficients are estimated 
from the ordinary least squares regression Policy(t) = a + b*Policy(t-1).  All variable definitions are 
included in Appendix Table A-I. 
 
 
Panel A: Pearson correlations 
 
Policy variables  Total Risk  Systematic 
Risk 
Idiosyncratic 
Risk  lnVega lnDelta 
Noninterest  0.095*** 0.276***  -0.004  0.435*** 0.394*** 
NoninterestLess  0.116***  0.263*** 0.030 0.405***  0.383*** 
Commercial  0.069** 0.015 0.075** 0.000  -0.021 
Commercial RE  -0.120*** -0.092*** -0.089*** -0.242*** -0.291*** 
Mortgage   -0.194*** -0.250*** -0.159*** -0.104***  -0.079** 
Provisions  0.288*** 0.111*** 0.214*** 0.197*** 0.189*** 
Private MBS  0.084*** 0.041 0.085***  0.070**  0.134*** 
Total Risk  -- -- --  0.049  0.049 
Systematic Risk  -- -- --  0.268***  0.220*** 





Panel B: Average Autocorrelation Coefficients 
 
 N  Mean  b 
Vega  65     0.7092*** 
Delta  65    0.6232*** 
Noninterest  65    0.6335*** 
NoninterestLess  65    0.4870*** 
Commercial  65    0.5935*** 
Commercial RE  65    0.7211*** 
Mortgage   65    0.5066*** 
Provisions  65    0.4478*** 
Private MBS  44    0.3818*** 
Total Risk  65    0.5217*** 
Systematic Risk  65    0.0987* 
Idiosyncratic Risk  65    0.6475*** 
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 Table IV Two-stage Least Squares Results for the Full Sample 
 
This table displays selected two-stage least squares parameters from equations (1), (2) and (3).  The 
parameters are estimated based on an unbalanced data panel of 881 annual observations for 134 different 
publicly traded U.S. banking companies from 1994 to 2006.  Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix Table A-I.  The superscripts ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]  [8] [9] 
dependent 
variable:  Policy Policy Policy lnVega  lnVega  lnVega  lnDelta  lnDelta  lnDelta 
panel data 






















CEO if no 
large M&A 
Systematic Risk     -3.396  -3.396  -3.396  1.193  1.193  1.193 
        [2.148] [2.544] [2.426] [0.742]  [1.030] [0.893] 
lnVega  0.286***  0.286**  0.286***      0.481***  0.481**  0.481*** 
  [0.085] [0.122] [0.105]        [0.143]  [0.218] [0.174] 
lnDelta  -0.100** -0.100  -0.100*  -0.429  -0.429  -0.429       
  [0.045] [0.065] [0.055] [0.311] [0.425] [0.391]       
Idiosyncratic Risk      -180.595* -180.595 -180.595*  81.395  81.395  81.395 
        [94.579] [110.179]  [104.388] [49.968] [69.021] [60.273] 
lnVega  0.003*** 0.003*  0.003**        0.575***  0.575***  0.575*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]        [0.127]  [0.198] [0.147] 
lnDelta  -0.001*  -0.001 -0.001 -0.226 -0.226 -0.226       
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.206] [0.302] [0.272]       
Total Risk      -210.156*  -210.156*  -210.156*  100.905  100.905  100.905 
      [109.316]  [127.664]  [120.320]  [62.359]  [85.648]  [74.768] 
lnVega  0.002** 0.002  0.002        0.602***  0.602***  0.602*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]        [0.128]  [0.201] [0.148] 
lnDelta  0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.165  -0.165  -0.165       
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.193] [0.286] [0.256]       
Noninterest     1.231  1.231  1.231  -2.077**  -2.077  -2.077* 
        [1.175] [1.780] [1.687] [0.925]  [1.298] [1.183] 
lnVega  0.102*** 0.102*  0.102**        0.791***  0.791***  0.791*** 
  [0.038] [0.060] [0.048]        [0.171]  [0.266] [0.211] 
lnDelta  -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106***  0.078  0.078  0.078       
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  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]  [8] [9] 
dependent 
variable:  Policy Policy Policy lnVega  lnVega  lnVega  lnDelta  lnDelta  lnDelta 
panel data 






















CEO if no 
large M&A 
NoninterestLess      2.273  2.273  2.273  -3.802**  -3.802  -3.802 
        [2.182] [3.321] [3.123] [1.837]  [2.653] [2.357] 
lnVega  0.072** 0.072  0.072*        0.822***  0.822***  0.822*** 
  [0.032] [0.052] [0.038]        [0.200]  [0.316] [0.241] 
lnDelta  -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068***  0.105  0.105  0.105       
  [0.017] [0.026] [0.023] [0.269] [0.411] [0.382]       
Private MBS     -107.595  -107.595  -107.595  13.252  13.252  13.252 
      [103.117]  [144.961]  [120.754]  [8.799]  [11.061]  [9.333] 
lnVega  0.028** 0.028  0.028*        0.228  0.228  0.228 
  [0.013] [0.019] [0.016]        [0.251]  [0.328] [0.275] 
lnDelta  0.013** 0.013  0.013*  1.217  1.217  1.217       
  [0.006] [0.010] [0.008] [1.414] [2.026] [1.594]       
Commercial     -1.807  -1.807  -1.807  0.796  0.796  0.796 
      [6.291]  [10.257]  [9.707]  [5.516]  [8.714]  [7.393] 
lnVega  0.011 0.011 0.011        0.693***  0.693***  0.693*** 
  [0.012] [0.019] [0.015]        [0.154]  [0.252] [0.190] 
lnDelta  -0.020** -0.020 -0.020** -0.124  -0.124  -0.124       
  [0.008] [0.012] [0.010] [0.185] [0.285] [0.257]       
Commercial RE     -0.488  -0.488  -0.488  0.219  0.219  0.219 
        [1.672] [2.729] [2.594] [1.519]  [2.400] [2.043] 
lnVega  -0.048*** -0.048*  -0.048**        0.695***  0.695***  0.695*** 
  [0.018] [0.026] [0.023]        [0.160]  [0.263] [0.202] 
lnDelta  0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042***  -0.063  -0.063  -0.063       
  [0.011] [0.016] [0.014] [0.187] [0.296] [0.274]       
Mortgage      -0.948  -0.948  -0.948  0.431  0.431  0.431 
        [3.251] [5.298] [5.037] [2.999]  [4.741] [4.041] 
lnVega  -0.036** -0.036  -0.036*        0.701***  0.701**  0.701*** 
  [0.018] [0.027] [0.021]        [0.185]  [0.305] [0.241] 
lnDelta  0.019* 0.019  0.019 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065       
  [0.011] [0.017] [0.014] [0.182] [0.287] [0.265]       
Provisions       20.984  20.984  20.984  -29.299  -29.299  -29.299 
        [160.385] [262.549] [248.260] [140.532]  [222.251] [189.935] 
lnVega  0.002** 0.002* 0.002**        0.679***  0.679**  0.679*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]        [0.185]  [0.281] [0.220] 
lnDelta  -0.001*  -0.001 -0.001 -0.095 -0.095 -0.095       
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.175] [0.269] [0.243]       
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Table V  Two-stage Least Squares Results after Controlling for Post-1999 Effects 
 
This table displays selected two-stage least squares parameters from flexible specifications of equations 
(1), (2) and (3) that include post-1999 intercept and slope parameters.  The parameters are estimated 
based on an unbalanced data panel of 881 annual observations for 134 different publicly traded U.S. 
banking companies from 1994 to 2006.  Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  All variable 
definitions are included in Appendix Table A-I.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  The asterisks in the shaded SUM cells indicate whether the 
post-1999 influences of Policy, lnVega or lnDelta on the dependent variable were statistically significant. 
   
  [1] [2] [3]      [1] [2] [3] 
dependent variable:  Policy  lnVega  lnDelta    dependent variable:  Policy lnVega  lnDelta 
panel data  treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled    panel data treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled 
             
Systematic Risk   0.162  2.096**    Private MBS   6.341  13.569 
   [1.075]  [0.828]       [16.522]  [8.694] 
Post1999*   -1.091  -1.560*    Post1999*   -27.882***  -1.046 
   Systematic Risk   [1.064]  [0.847]       Private MBS   [6.971]  [5.735] 
SUM         SUM       
lnVega  0.387***   0.432**    lnVega  0.031***   0.202 
  [0.070]  [0.185]      [0.008]  [0.303] 
Post1999*lnVega  -0.318***  0.314***    Post1999*lnVega  -0.0002   0.148*** 
  [0.043]  [0.092]      [0.005]  [0.057] 
SUM      ***   SUM  ***     
lnDelta  -0.089** -0.250      lnDelta  0.006 -0.066   
  [0.040] [0.161]        [0.004] [0.317]   
Post1999*lnDelta  0.037 0.316**      Post1999*lnDelta  0.011 0.339***   
  [0.048] [0.153]        [0.007] [0.085]   
SUM         SUM  ***     
Post1999  0.890*** 0.071  -0.200    Post1999  -0.089*** -0.558  -0.716** 
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 [1]  [2]  [3]      [1]  [2]  [3] 
dependent variable:  Policy  lnVega  lnDelta    dependent variable:  Policy lnVega  lnDelta 
panel data  treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled    panel data treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled 
             
Idiosyncratic Risk   -85.980  182.852    Commercial   -17.613**  -0.894 
   [179.030]  [113.877]       [6.865]  [5.856] 
Post1999*   -187.961***  -55.257    Post1999*   21.654***  1.713 
   Idiosyncratic Risk   [39.960]  [38.591]       Commercial    [4.694]  [3.921] 
SUM         SUM       
lnVega  0.002  0.389    lnVega  0.018   0.659*** 
  [0.001]  [0.269]      [0.016]  [0.213] 
Post1999*lnVega  0.004***   0.099    Post1999*lnVega  -0.022*  0.137** 
  [0.001]  [0.073]      [0.012]  [0.059] 
SUM  ***    ***   SUM      *** 
lnDelta  0.002*** -0.076      lnDelta  -0.017 -0.260   
  [0.001] [0.142]        [0.012] [0.187]   
Post1999*lnDelta  -0.005*** 0.109      Post1999*lnDelta  0.002 0.199***   
  [0.001] [0.078]        [0.013] [0.077]   
SUM  ***       SUM       
Post1999  0.007** 2.905***  0.405   Post1999  0.066* -3.480*** -1.180* 
  [0.003] [0.793] [0.717]      [0.039] [0.833] [0.622] 
             
Total Risk   -112.185  172.404    Commercial RE   -1.330  -1.615 
   [176.129]  [114.070]       [2.039]  [2.121] 
Post1999*   -163.326***  -50.604*    Post1999*   -0.800  3.134* 
   Total Risk   [36.681]  [30.565]       Commercial RE   [1.983]  [1.798] 
SUM         SUM       
lnVega  0.002*   0.343    lnVega  -0.076***   0.563** 
  [0.001]  [0.279]      [0.018]  [0.263] 
Post1999*lnVega  0.004***   0.142**    Post1999*lnVega  -0.040***  0.291*** 
  [0.001]  [0.058]      [0.012]  [0.107] 
SUM  ***    ***   SUM  ***    *** 
lnDelta  0.003*** -0.254*      lnDelta  0.052*** -0.046   
  [0.001] [0.153]        [0.011] [0.194]   
Post1999*lnDelta  -0.006*** 0.266***      Post1999*lnDelta  0.009 0.168   
  [0.001] [0.079]        [0.014] [0.119]   
SUM  ***       SUM  ***     
Post1999  0.015*** 2.252***  0.188   Post1999  0.257*** 0.113 -2.018*** 
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  [1] [2] [3]      [1] [2] [3] 
dependent variable:  Policy  lnVega  lnDelta    dependent variable:  Policy lnVega  lnDelta 
panel data  treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled    panel data treatment:  pooled  pooled  pooled 
             
Noninterest   1.495  -0.773    Mortgage   -10.422**  -4.455 
   [1.213]  [0.971]       [4.646]  [3.970] 
Post1999*   -0.340  -1.929**    Post1999*   11.783***  7.017** 
   Noninterest   [0.964]  [0.872]       Mortgage   [4.024]  [3.327] 
SUM      ***   SUM       
lnVega  0.110***  0.668***    lnVega  -0.080***   0.610** 
  [0.032]  [0.216]      [0.023]  [0.282] 
Post1999*lnVega  0.066***  0.304***    Post1999*lnVega  0.047***  0.186*** 
  [0.021]  [0.086]      [0.016]  [0.057] 
SUM  ***    ***   SUM      *** 
lnDelta  -0.087*** -0.001      lnDelta  0.042*** -0.051   
  [0.019] [0.244]        [0.016] [0.183]   
Post1999*lnDelta  -0.058** 0.232**      Post1999*lnDelta  -0.036** 0.284***   
  [0.023] [0.109]        [0.017] [0.084]   
SUM  ***       SUM       
Post1999  -0.006 -0.414  -0.974***    Post1999  0.056 -2.857***  -2.326*** 
  [0.067] [0.481] [0.306]      [0.052] [1.031] [0.692] 
             
NoninterestLess   0.956  -1.349    Provisions   -376.939**  91.595 
   [2.185]  [1.748]       [166.754]  [152.508] 
Post1999*   1.883  -2.974*    Post1999*   456.119***  -180.611 
   NoninterestLess   [1.492]  [1.719]       Provisions   [153.564]  [186.251] 
SUM      ***   SUM       
lnVega  0.060**   0.614***    lnVega  0.002***   0.574** 
  [0.030]  [0.224]      [0.001]  [0.223] 
Post1999*lnVega  0.048***  0.335***    Post1999*lnVega  0.001***   0.272** 
  [0.018]  [0.121]      [0.000]  [0.128] 
SUM  ***    ***   SUM  ***    *** 
lnDelta  -0.036** 0.047      lnDelta  0.000 -0.156   
  [0.016] [0.243]        [0.000] [0.177]   
Post1999*lnDelta  -0.061*** 0.097      Post1999*lnDelta  -0.002*** -0.098   
  [0.021] [0.117]        [0.000] [0.129]   
SUM  ***       SUM  ***     
Post1999  0.122* -0.127  -1.149***    Post1999  0.005*** 0.359 -0.998*** 
  [0.063] [0.521] [0.310]      [0.001] [0.493] [0.317] 
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Figure 1 CEO Total Annual Compensation 
This figure reports the dollar value (in thousands of 2006 dollars) of total annual compensation (including salary, 
bonus, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation) for CEOs 
in banks (881 observations) versus industrial firms (19,447 observations) from 1994 to 2006. 
 
 











































































Figure 2 CEO Vega 
This figure reports the dollar value (in thousands of 2006 dollars) of vega (the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for 
a 0.01 change in standard deviation of returns) for CEOs in banks (881 observations) versus industrial firms (19,447 
observations) from 1994 to 2006. 
 
 










































































Figure 3 CEO Delta 
This figure reports the dollar value (in thousands of 2006 dollars) of delta (the dollar change in the CEO’s wealth for 
a 1% change in stock price) for CEOs in banks (881 observations) versus industrial firms (19,447 observations) 
from 1994 to 2006. 
 
 









































































Table A-I Variable definitions in alphabetical order* 
 
Assets  The ending balance of total assets. 
Commercial  Commercial and industrial loans, scaled by total assets. 
Commercial RE  Commercial real estate loans, scaled by total assets. 
Delta  The pay-performance sensitivity, which is the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth 
for a 1% change in stock price, measured by partial derivatives of Black-Scholes value 
of options and market value of stock holdings with respect to stock price.  
EconCond 
Defined differently across the ten versions of our model, but is always constructed from 
one of the following four different state-level data sources: the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Coincident Index of economic conditions for each state; the per-capita 
income for each state; and the payroll employment percentage for each state; and the 
ratio of non-core deposits to total deposits for each bank.   
Equity Ratio  Total equity capital over total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Idiosyncratic Risk  The standard deviation of the three-factor market model residuals over a year. 
MB  The ending balance of the market-to-book ratio of equity. 
Mortgage  Loans Secured by 1–4 family residential properties, scaled by total assets. 
Noninterest  Total noninterest income, scaled by net operating income. 
NoninterestLess  Total noninterest income less fiduciary income and deposit service charges, scaled by 
net operating income. 
Provisions  Provision for loan and lease losses, scaled by total assets. 
Private MBS  bThe fair value of private mortgage backed securities, scaled by total assets. 
Salary  The CEO’s annual base salary. 
Systematic Risk  The beta coefficient estimated from the three-factor market model over a year (The 
three factors are daily returns on a CRSP value-weighted market portfolio, daily three-
month T-bill yields, and daily treasury yield spreads (10-yeare T-bond minus 2-year T-
note) obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). 
Tenure   The number of years in the CEO’s term. 
Total Risk  The standard deviation of daily stock returns over a year. 
Vega  The pay-risk sensitivity, which is the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 
0.01 change in stock return volatility, measured by partial derivatives of Black-Scholes 
value of options with respect to stock return volatility. 
 
*All dollar values are in thousands of 2006 dollars. 
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Table A-II: Full Regression Results for Systematic Risk 
This table displays estimated two-stage least squares parameters from equations (1), (2) and (3) using systematic risk as the dependent variable.  The parameters are estimated 
based on an unbalanced data panel of 881 annual observations for 134 different publicly traded U.S. banking companies from 1994 to 2006.  Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  All variable definitions are included in Appendix Table A-I.  The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.   
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
dependent variable:  Policy  Policy  Policy  lnVega  lnVega  lnVega  lnDelta  lnDelta  lnDelta 






















CEO if no 
large M&A 
Systematic Risk      -3.396  -3.396  -3.396  1.193  1.193  1.193 
      [2.148]  [2.544]  [2.426] [0.742] [1.030] [0.893] 
lnVega  0.286*** 0.286** 0.286***        0.481*** 0.481** 0.481*** 
  [0.085] [0.122] [0.105]       [0.143]  [0.218]  [0.174] 
lnDelta  -0.100** -0.1  -0.100*  -0.429 -0.429 -0.429       
  [0.045] [0.065] [0.055] [0.311] [0.425] [0.391]       
lnAssets  -0.081 -0.081 -0.081  0.822***  0.822***  0.822***  0.119  0.119  0.119 
  [0.052] [0.073] [0.063] [0.206] [0.254] [0.242] [0.096] [0.151] [0.112] 
lnMB  0.176* 0.176  0.176 1.710*  1.71  1.71  0.959***  0.959***  0.959*** 
  [0.091] [0.122] [0.112] [0.934] [1.178] [1.089] [0.226] [0.321] [0.279] 
Equity Ratio  -1.748* -1.748  -1.748  4.984  4.984 4.984 -2.853  -2.853  -2.853 
  [0.990] [1.326] [1.160] [3.823] [5.670] [5.300] [2.000] [2.739] [2.395] 
EconCond   0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***             
  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.003]        
lnSalary      1.770***  1.770**  1.770**     
      [0.554]  [0.776]  [0.696]     
Tenure         0.050***  0.050***  0.050*** 
         [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
constant  0.812 0.812 0.812  -19.880***  -19.880***  -19.880***  -0.734  -0.734  -0.734 
  [0.644] [0.944] [0.816] [4.510] [5.953] [5.454] [1.379] [2.105] [1.654] 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Kleibergen-Paap test of 
under-identification  17.965*** 9.045*** 10.680*** 8.705***  4.945** 5.942**  17.963***  10.311***  13.417*** 
 
 